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Introduction
Much has been written about why
electronic health (eHealth) initiatives fail
[1–4]. Less attention has been paid to why
evaluations of such initiatives fail to deliver
the insights expected of them. PLoS
Medicine has published three papers offer-
ing a ‘‘robust’’ and ‘‘scientific’’ approach
to eHealth evaluation [5–7]. One recom-
mended systematically addressing each
part of a ‘‘chain of reasoning’’, at the
centre of which was the program’s goals
[6]. Another proposed a quasi-experimen-
tal step-wedge design, in which late
adopters of eHealth innovations serve as
controls for early adopters [5]. Interest-
ingly, the authors of the empirical study
flagged by these authors as an exemplary
illustration of the step-wedge design sub-
sequently abandoned it in favour of a
largely qualitative case study because they
found it impossible to establish anything
approaching a controlled experiment in
the study’s complex, dynamic, and heavily
politicised context [8].
The approach to evaluation presented
in the previous PLoS Medicine series rests on
a set of assumptions that philosophers of
science call ‘‘positivist’’ [9]: that there is an
external reality that can be objectively
measured; that phenomena such as ‘‘proj-
ect goals’’, ‘‘outcomes’’, and ‘‘formative
feedback’’ can be precisely and unambig-
uously defined; that facts and values are
clearly distinguishable; and that generali-
sable statements about the relationship
between input and output variables are
possible.
Alternative approaches to eHealth eval-
uation are based on very different philo-
sophical assumptions [9]. For example,
N ‘‘interpretivist’’ approaches assume a
socially constructed reality (i.e., people
perceive issues in different ways and
assign different values and significance
to facts)—hence, reality is never ob-
jectively or unproblematically know-
able—and that the identity and values
of the researcher are inevitably impli-
cated in the research process [10].
N ‘‘critical’’ approaches assume that crit-
ical questioning can generate insights
about power relationships and interests
and that one purpose of evaluation is
to ask such questions on behalf of less
powerful and potentially vulnerable
groups (such as patients) [11].
Beyond Questions of Science
Catwell and Sheikh argue that ‘‘health
information systems should be evaluated
with the same rigor as a new drug or
treatment program, otherwise decisions
about future deployments of ICT in the
health sector may be determined by social,
economic, and/or political circumstances,
rather than by robust scientific evidence’’
([6], page 1).
In contrast to this view of evaluation as
scientific testing, scholars in critical-inter-
pretivist traditions view evaluation as social
practice—that is, as actively engaging with a
social situation and considering how that
situation is framed and enacted by partic-
ipants [12–20]. A key quality criterion in
such studies is reflexivity—consciously
thinking about issues such as values,
perspectives, relationships, and trust.
These traditions reject the assumption that
a rigorous evaluation can be exclusively
scientific. Rather, they hold that as well as
the scientific agenda of factors, variables,
and causal relationships, the evaluation
must also embrace the emotions, values,
and conflicts associated with a program
[19]. eHealth ‘‘interventions’’ may lie in
the technical and scientific world, but
eHealth dreams, visions, policies, and
programs have personal, social, political,
and ideological components, and therefore
typically prove fuzzy, slippery, and unsta-
ble when we seek to define and control
them [21].
Kushner observes that ‘‘The [positivist
evaluation] model is elegant in its simplic-
ity, appealing for its rationality, reasonable
in asking little more than that people do
what they say they will do, and efficient in
its economical definition of what data
count’’ ([18], page 16). But he goes on to
list various shortcomings (summarised
below), which were illustrated in our
evaluation of a nationally stored electronic
Summary Care Record (SCR) in England
[21,22]. The SCR was part of a larger
National Programme for IT in the Na-
tional Health Service [23], viewed by
many stakeholders as monolithic, politi-
cally driven, and inflexible [4,8].
The first problem with scientific evalu-
ation, suggests Kushner, is that programs
typically have multiple and contested
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serve as a fixed referent for comparison.
An early finding of our evaluation was that
the SCR program had numerous goals
(e.g., politicians were oriented to perfor-
mance and efficiency targets, doctors saw
the main goal as improving clinical quality
in out-of-hours care, and civil liberties
lobbyists perceived the program an at-
tempt by the state to encroach on
individual privacy) [21].
Second, outcomes are not stable; they
erode and change over time and across
contexts. In the SCR program, it was
originally planned that patients would
access their electronic record from home
via linked software called HealthSpace,
thereby becoming ‘‘empowered’’. But
HealthSpace was subsequently uncoupled
from the SCR program because it was
deemed ‘‘high risk’’ by civil servants [24].
Third, Kushner suggests, the causal link
between process and outcome is typically
interrupted by so many intervening vari-
ables as to make it unreliable. In the SCR
evaluation, we documented 56 such vari-
ables—including training, permissions,
physical space, technical interoperability,
local policies and protocols, professional
sanction, and point-of-care consent [21].
Fourth, key characteristics of program
success may not be articulated in the
vocabulary of outcomes and may not yield
to measurement. One such dimension of the
SCR program was the variable culture of e-
governance across different organisations
(e.g., the extent to which it was acceptable
for staff to forget their passwords or leave
machines ‘‘logged on’’ when going to lunch).
Finally, program learning that leads
away from initial objectives threatens
failure against outcome criteria. In the
SCR program, an early finding was that
predefined milestones (e.g., number of
records created by a target date) were
sometimes counterproductive since imple-
mentation teams were required to push
forward in the absence of full clinical and
patient engagement, which sometimes led
to strong local resistance. We recommend-
ed that these milestones be made locally
negotiable. But because critics of the
program interpreted missed milestones as
evidence of ‘‘failure’’, policymakers took
little heed of this advice.
Beyond Variables
‘‘Scientific’’ evaluation aims to produce
statistical statements about the relationship
between abstracted variables such as ‘‘IT
response times’’, ‘‘resource use’’, and
‘‘morbidity/mortality’’ [5]. But the pro-
cess of producing such variables may
remove essential contextual features that
are key to explaining the phenomenon
under study. Controlled, feature-at-a-time
comparisons are vulnerable to repeated
decomposition: there are features within
features, contingencies within contingen-
cies, and tasks within tasks [25].
Expressing findings as statistical rela-
tionships between variables may draw
attention away from people taking action
[20]. In the real world of eHealth
implementation, designers design, manag-
ers manage, trainers train, clinicians
deliver care, and auditors monitor perfor-
mance; people exhibit particular person-
ality traits, express emotions, enact power
relationships, and generate and deal with
conflict. Technologies also ‘‘act’’ in their
own non-human way: for example, they
boot up, crash, transmit, compute, aggre-
gate, and permit or deny access. A
statistical approach may produce more or
less valid and more or less reliable
estimates of effect size (and hence a
‘‘robust’’ evaluation), but ‘‘When we enter
the world of variables, we leave behind the
ingredients that are needed to produce a
story with the kind of substance and
verisimilitude that can give a convincing
basis for practical action’’ ([20], page 124).
‘‘Substance’’ (conveying something that
feels real) and ‘‘verisimilitude’’ (something
that rings true) are linked to the narrative
process, which Karl Weick called ‘‘sense-
making’’ [26], which is essential in a
multifaceted program whose goals are
contested and whose baseline is continually
shifting. Collection and analysis of qualita-
tive and quantitative data help illuminate
these complexities rather than produce a
single ‘‘truth’’. The narrative form pre-
ferred by social scientists for reporting
complex case studies allows tensions and
ambiguities to be included as key findings,
which may be preferable to expressing the
‘‘main’’ findings as statistical relationships
between variables and mentioning incon-
sistencies as a footnote or not at all. Our
final SCR report was written as an
extended narrative to capture the multiple
conflicting framings and inherent tensions
thatneitherwenorthe program’sarchitects
could resolve [21].
Beyond ‘‘Independence’’ and
‘‘Objectivity’’
MacDonald and Kushner identify three
forms of evaluation of government-spon-
sored programs: bureaucratic, autocratic,
and democratic, which represent different
levels of independence from the state [27].
Using this taxonomy, the approach en-
dorsed by the previous PLoS Medicine series
[5–7] represents a welcome shift from a
bureaucratic model (in which manage-
ment consultants were commissioned to
produce evaluations that directly served
political ends) to an autocratic model (in
which academic experts use systematic
methods to produce objective reports that
are published independently). But it falls
short of the democratic model—in which
evaluators engage, explicitly and reflexive-
ly, with the arguments exchanged by
different stakeholders about ideas, values,
and priorities—to which our own team
aspired. ‘‘Independence’’ as defined by the
terms of autocratic evaluation (effectively,
lack of censorship by the state and peer
review by other academics who place
politics out of scope) pushes evaluators to
resist the very engagement with the issues
that policy-relevant insights require.
In sum, critical-interpretivist approach-
es to evaluation have different quality
criteria and generate different kinds of
knowledge than ‘‘scientific’’ (quasi-experi-
mental) approaches. These differences are
summarised in Tables 1 and 2.
An Alternative Set of Guiding
Principles for eHealth
Evaluation
Lilford et al. identify four ‘‘tricky
questions’’ in eHealth evaluation (qualita-
tive or quantitative?; patient or system?;
Summary Points
N We argue that the assumptions, methods, and study designs of experimental
science, whilst useful in many contexts, may be ill-suited to the particular
challenges of evaluating eHealth programs, especially in politicised situations
where goals and success criteria are contested.
N We offer an alternative set of guiding principles for eHealth evaluation based on
traditions that view evaluation as social practice rather than as scientific testing,
and illustrate these with the example of England’s controversial Summary Care
Record program.
N We invite PLoS Medicine readers to join a debate on the relative merits of
‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘social practice’’ approaches to evaluation and consider the
extent to which eHealth evaluation is in need of a paradigm shift.
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Positivist Studies Critical-Interpretive Studies
Principle Explanation Principle Explanation
1. Over-arching principle of
statistical inference (relating
the sample to the population)
Research is undertaken on a sample that
should be adequately powered and
statistically representative of the
population from which it is drawn
1. Over-arching principle of
the hermeneutic circle
(relating the parts to the whole)
Human understanding is achieved by
iterating between the different parts of
a phenomenon and the whole that they
form
2. Principle of multiple
interacting variables
The relationship between input and
output variables is affected by numerous
mediating and moderating variables, the
complete and accurate measurement of
which will capture ‘‘context’’
2. Principle of contextualisation Observations are context-bound and
only make sense when placed in an
interpretive narrative that shows how
they emerged from a particular social
and historical background
3. Principle of distance Good research involves a clear separation
between researcher and the people and
organisations on which research is
undertaken
3. Principle of interaction and
immersion
Good research involves engagement
and dialogue between researcher and
research participants, and immersion in
the organisational and social context of
the study
4. Principle of statistical
abstraction and generalisation
Generalisablity is achieved by
demonstrating precision, accuracy and
reproducibility of relationships between
variables
4. Principle of theoretical
abstraction and generalisation
Generalisability is achieved by relating
particular observations and
interpretations to a coherent and
plausible theoretical model
5. Principle of elimination
of bias
Good research eliminates bias through
robust methodological designs
(e.g., randomisation, stratification)
5. Principle of researcher
reflexivity
All research is perspectival. Good
research exhibits ongoing reflexivity
about how the researchers’ own
backgrounds, interests, and
preconceptions affect the questions
posed, data gathered, and
interpretations offered
6. Principle of a single reality
amenable to scientific
measurement
There is one reality which scientists may
access, provided they use the right study
designs, methods, and instruments
6. Principle of multiple
interpretations
All complex social phenomena are open
to multiple interpretations. ‘‘Success
criteria’’ and ‘‘findings’’ will be
contested. Good research identifies and
explores these multiple ‘‘truths’’.
7. Principle of empiricism There is a direct relationship between
what is measured and underlying reality,
subject to the robustness of the methods
and the precision and accuracy of the
instruments
7. Principle of critical
questioning
The ‘‘truth’’ is not what it appears to be.
Critical questioning may generate
insights about hidden political
influences and domination. Ethical
research includes a duty to ask such
questions on behalf of vulnerable or
less powerful groups.
Adapted from [10].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000360.t001
Table 2. Different Kinds of Knowledge Generated by Different Kinds of Evaluation.
Positivist Evaluations Critical-Interpretive Evaluations
Focuses on objective methods oriented to the collection of
‘‘formal knowledge’’ as data, thereby producing:
N Quantitative estimates of the relationship between predefined input
and output variables, and confidence intervals around these
N Deconstruction of ‘‘context’’ to produce quantitative estimates and/or
qualitative explanations of the effect of mediating and moderating
variables on the relationship between input and output variables
N Judgement of the extent to which a program has achieved its original
goals and the contribution of different elements in the original chain of
reasoning to this
N Statistical generalisation, allowing prediction of how well a particular
eHealth technology is likely to work in other contexts and settings
N Quantification of how evaluators’ formative feedback has influenced
outcome
N ‘‘Endpoint’’ knowledge with evaluation methods providing the
means to the ‘‘end’’ of producing judgements in a final evaluation report
N Explanatory and predictive knowledge
Focuses on naturalistic methods that may capture both formal and informal (tacit,
embodied, practical) knowledge, and also co-create learning through dialogue
between stakeholders, thereby producing:
N Map of the different stakeholders and insights into their expectations, values, and
framings of the program; illumination of who is accountable to whom
N Problematisation of ‘‘success’’; insights into the struggle between stakeholder
groups to define and judge success and whose voices are dominant in this struggle
N Illumination of how the eHealth technology exacerbates (or, perhaps, helps
overcome) power differentials between different groups (e.g., through differential
exposure to surveillance or access to data)
N A rich, contextualised narrative that conveys the multiple perspectives on the
program and its complex interdependencies and ambiguities
N Theoretical generalisation, allowing potentially transferable explanations of the
dynamic and reciprocal relationship between macro-, meso-, and micro-level
influences
N Reflections on how formative feedback and the relationship between evaluators
and evaluands may have influenced the program, hence advice to future
evaluators on how to manage these relationships
N Understanding and illumination
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000360.t002
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external?) and resolve these by recom-
mending mixed-method, patient-and-sys-
tem studies in which internal evaluations
(undertaken by practitioners and policy-
makers) are formative and external ones
(undertaken by ‘‘impartial’’ researchers)
are summative [5]. In our view, the tricky
questions are more philosophical and
political than methodological and proce-
dural.
We offer below an alternative (and at
this stage, provisional) set of principles,
initially developed to guide our evaluation
of the SCR program [22,28], which we
invite others to critique, test, and refine.
These principles are deliberately presented
in a somewhat abstracted and generalised
way, since they will need to be applied
flexibly with attention to the particularities
and contingencies of different contexts and
settings. Each principle will be more or less
relevant to a particular project, and their
relative importance will differ in different
evaluations.
First, think about your own role in the
evaluation. Try to strike a balance be-
tween critical distance on the one hand
and immersion and engagement on the
other. Ask questions such as What am I
investigating—and on whose behalf? How
do I balance my obligations to the various
institutions and individuals involved? Who
owns the data I collect? [29].
Second, put in place a governance
process (including a broad-based advisory
group with an independent chair) that
formally recognises that there are multiple
stakeholders and that power is unevenly
distributed between them. Map out every-
one’s expectations of the program and the
evaluation. Be clear that simply because a
sponsor pays for an evaluation it does not
have special claim on its services or
exemption from its focus [30].
Third, provide the interpersonal and
analytic space for effective dialogue (e.g.,
by offering to feed back anonymised data
from one group of stakeholders to anoth-
er). Conversation and debate is not simply
a means to an end, it can be an end in
itself. Learning happens more through the
processes of evaluation than from the final
product of an evaluation report [31].
Fourth, take an emergent approach. An
evaluation cannot be designed at the
outset and pursued relentlessly to its
conclusions; it must grow and adapt in
response to findings and practical issues
which arise in fieldwork. Build theory from
emerging data, not the other way round
(for example, instead of seeking to test a
predefined ‘‘causal chain of reasoning’’,
explore such links by observing social
practices).
Fifth, consider the dynamic macro-level
context (economic, political, demographic,
technological) in which the eHealth inno-
vation is being introduced [28]. Your
stakeholder map and challenges of putting
together your advisory group should form
part of this dataset.
Sixth, consider the different meso-level
contexts (e.g., organisations, professional
groups, networks), how action plays out in
these settings (e.g., in terms of culture,
strategic decisions, expectations of staff,
incentives, rewards) and how this changes
over time. Include reflections on the
research process (e.g., gaining access) in
this dataset.
Seventh, consider the individuals (e.g.,
clinicians, managers, service users)
through whom the eHealth innovation(s)
will be adopted, deployed, and used.
Explore their backgrounds, identities and
capabilities; what the technology means to
them and what they think will happen if
and when they use it.
Eighth, consider the eHealth technolo-
gies, the expectations and constraints
inscribed in them (e.g., access controls,
decision models) and how they ‘‘work’’ or
not in particular conditions of use. Expose
conflicts and ambiguities (e.g., between
professional codes of practice and the
behaviours expected by technologies).
Ninth, use narrative as an analytic tool
and to synthesise findings. Analyse a
sample of small-scale incidents in detail
to unpack the complex ways in which
macro- and meso-level influences impact
on technology use at the front line. When
writing up the case study, the story form
will allow you to engage with the messiness
and unpredictability of the program; make
sense of complex interlocking events; treat
conflicting findings (e.g., between the
accounts of top management and staff) as
higher-order data; and open up space for
further interpretation and deliberation.
Finally, consider critical events in rela-
tion to the evaluation itself. Document
systematically stakeholders’ efforts to re-
draw the boundaries of the evaluation,
influence the methods, contest the find-
ings, amend the language, modify the
conclusions, and delay or suppress publi-
cation.
Conclusion
eHealth initiatives often occur in a
complex and fast-moving socio-political
arena. The tasks of generating, authoris-
ing, and disseminating evidence on the
success of these initiatives do not occur in
a separate asocial and apolitical bubble.
They are often produced by, and in turn
feed back into, the political process of
deciding priorities and allocating resources
to pursue them [17,19]. The dispassionate
scientist pursuing universal truths may add
less value to such a situation than the
engaged scholar interpreting practice in
context [19,32].
Differences in underlying philosophical
position may lead to opposing quality
criteria for ‘‘robust’’ evaluations. Some
eHealth initiatives will lend themselves to
scientific evaluation based mainly or even
entirely on positivist assumptions, but
others, particularly those that are large-
scale, complex, politically driven, and
differently framed by different stakehold-
ers, may require evaluators to reject these
assumptions and apply alternative criteria
for rigour [33,34]. The precise balance
between ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘alternative’’
approaches will depend on the nature
and context of the program and probably
cannot be stipulated in advance. An
informed debate on ways of knowing in
eHealth evaluation is urgently needed. We
offer this paper to open it.
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